# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LIII, No. 1382

December 20, 1965



*For index see inside back cover*

*President Johnson has called on the wisest and boldest spirits" in the United States to actively engage in "the quest for a new order of world cooperation." For the past year, 80 citizens' committees, each concentrating on an area of special interest, have been engaged in such a task, and from November 28 to December 1 they presented their recommendations at a White House Conference on International Cooperation. The conference opened with an address by Vice President Humphrey, who also read a welcoming statement by President Johnson. Addresses were made by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke at the closing session.*

# White House Conference on International Cooperation

## ADDRESS BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, NOVEMBER 29

It is a politician's highest reward to speak to people who are already convinced. It is my reward today.

I do not delude myself into thinking that I will today create any converts to the cause of international cooperation. But perhaps, together, we can spread the gospel to those who could stand an occasional sermon on that subject.

Churchill said that jaw, jaw is better than war, war. In this conference we will apply that principle.

There was a crusty old farm leader in Washington during the early days of the New Deal. His name was George Peek. George Peek said: "The common characteristic of all uplifters is an unquenchable thirst for conversation. They are all chain talkers."

So be it. Let us talk. Let us think. Let us agree and disagree.

But this conference can result in more than talk alone, and international cooperation can result in more than the avoidance of war alone.

Our task here is to increase the areas of man's interdependence so that we may de-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIII, NO. 1382 PUBLICATION 8005 DECEMBER 20, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

urgent problem facing mankind—that of disarmament. I take heart in the fact that the General Assembly has voted unanimously in one case and overwhelmingly in the other on resolutions calling for a nonproliferation agreement and a comprehensive test ban.

We need desperately to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and agreement on a genuine and meaningful comprehensive test ban treaty would be an important complement to a nonproliferation agreement.

I am sure that, if all the nations invited to participate in the proposed world disarmament conference are sincere and if appropriate preparations for it can be made, the voice of reason may yet be heard in the nuclear wilderness. It is a hope I would encourage. We should always be prepared to talk with anyone, anytime, about peace and disarmament. Nothing less than civilization itself is at stake.

There are more, sadly, many more obstacles I could mention. But even this brief list points up how lonely is the quest for peace and how far we still stand from the goal of true international cooperation.

### A Search for New Answers

But if it is cause for grave concern, it is even more reason for creative thought and statesmanship. For every problem there is opportunity that must be embraced and met, not with gloom and pessimism but with a determination to find the evasive solution.

And that, I believe, should be your mood when you conclude your conference tomorrow —determination that not even the bad habit of past disharmony will diminish eloquent hope of future world law and order.

You are already setting an exciting example for all Americans to follow as you search out new answers to the international concerns of poverty, disease, a fair share of the earth's bounties, the peaceful uses of the atom, the benefits to be derived from outer space—every concern, in short, that seeks to elevate the quality and the well-being of the earth and its inhabitants.

I congratulate you, for yours is an effort in full keeping with the rich heritage of our past and the proud hopes we have for the future. It is my hope that, when you return to your home communities throughout the country, you and the work you do will spearhead a new wave of cooperation and understanding. In this fashion will we, as Americans, make a notable advance in our effort to fulfill man's sacred stir for justice.

On the calendar International Cooperation Year will end in another month, but on the agenda of man it must continue for all time. There is no other way of building a world of peace and order.

Neither is there any other way of heeding the simple truth spoken so clearly and poetically in the UNESCO charter, "that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed."

## REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK, DECEMBER 1

I do want to make just a few preliminary remarks before turning to your questions. Your chairman was very tactful in saying that I would be willing to take some questions. I understand that you want me to say as little as possible, and get to your questions right away, which I shall try to do.

But I do want to add my own personal thanks to those which you have had from others, for the work that you are giving to this conference and to the committees. There is no unimportant committee among the 30. And I say this because the work for peace stretches across the entire spectrum of human endeavor.

One of the most stimulating and encouraging elements in this present world situation has to do with the unseen work for peace that goes on all the time. It makes up 80 percent of the work of a department like the Department of State. It involves more than 600 intergovernmental meetings each year, most of which you never hear about—meetings ranging from attempts to control nuclear weapons to attempts to control hog

cholera. That work is making up what Wilfred Jenks called a "common law of mankind."

Brick by brick there is evolving an enormous and stable structure of international cooperation, based upon the necessity for men to consider their common interests as men inhabiting this small planet. It's important that we can get a report from a particular country that there was no indigenous case of malaria last year. It's important that another country can report that there was no indigenous case of measles among its children for all of last year. It's important that I could read in a newspaper that an American naval doctor went out into the Atlantic, at a considerable distance from our shores, to tend the master of a Soviet vessel who had encountered a medical crisis. And it's also important that I read about it in the newspaper, and it was not a policy problem on my desk. The policy was taken for granted.

Now this is going on all the time, and the work of all 30 committees can contribute enormously to that building of a decent world order, to the building of cooperation that affects almost everything we do in our own daily lives, as human beings trying to work out some sort of decent existence.

I would like to underline that the problem of peace is a different problem today than it has ever been in our history before. President Eisenhower in his second term, President Kennedy, President Johnson have had to think about problems that no other American President has ever had to think about, because in the midfifties a full nuclear exchange began to be possible. The notion of the survival of the human race has moved from metaphor to operational reality.

Perhaps some of you may have heard me say this before, but at the close of World War II we all tried to sit down and think long and hard about what kind of world we wanted to live in. We drew the lessons from that war—we wrote the United Nations Charter. We shall not have that chance again. We shall not be able to sit down after world war III and draw its lessons and start over again. We've got, somehow, to get deeply into our spirits the lessons that we know are there and use them to prevent that war—if there is to be anything like a decent life among men on this planet.

I think there would be, in general, agreement on that idea, right around the globe. I find it hard to take completely seriously statements in Peiping that they hope to persuade their fellow Communists not to take such a dismal view of war. They say this is the problem with the "revisionists." Well, we're not revisionists, as Peiping speaks of them. But I can tell you we take a very dismal view of war. And we would hope that there is a practicality and sufficient sanity among those who talk about a dismal view of war to give us a chance still to build a peace.

I think we can be encouraged by the fact that I think all governments—and I don't qualify "all governments"—these days probably realize that a full nuclear exchange is an irrational act and cannot be considered as a rational instrument of policy. I think we're very close to being able to say, with reasonable confidence, that the sending of mass divisions across the frontiers is recognized as too dangerous, and too reckless in the modern world, to be a suitable instrument of policy.

But we still have in front of us the problem of the use of force, infiltration, attempts to impose one's will on other people by forceful measures, short of a general war, and so we are driven back to the question as to how we can best establish the peace. And on that question, let's admit, among frail human beings, that this is a question which makes pygmies of everyone. And if there are those here who feel that they have a sure, complete, solid answer, take care, take care. Approach these problems somewhat on your knees. What the leaders in the world today need are your prayers and not your imprecations, because these are difficult questions.

We who are older have the problem of forgetting those things which we ought to forget, and those who are young have the

problem of trying to grasp the reality of the things which they've had no chance to remember. And so we all have difficulties.

What do we do about the phenomenon of appetite? The doctrine of appetite is clear and in front of us, put forward in its harshest form by Peiping, with a violence which has caused great problems even within the Communist world—quite apart from the problems it has caused for the free world. How do we deal with those who are determined, by their own declarations and their own conduct, to impose their views and their will upon others by force?

Do we say, once again, that perhaps this next step will be enough? And that they will be satisfied? Or do we make it clear that every nation, large and small, has a right to live its own life, even though it is within the reach of great power. There are some things that it is difficult to forget.

I was in the Oxford Union in 1933 when C. E. M. Joad moved the motion that "this house will not fight for king and country," and in uniform a few years later I saw a statement by C. E. M. Joad saying to that same generation of young people, "Now, chaps, this fellow Hitler is different—now get out and fight." He did not add in his statement, "and without the weapons and the training which I helped to deprive you of." And so a friend of mine in the Black Watch told me that his battalion charged Nazi panzers at Dunkirk with naked bayonets in order to help a few more of his comrades get off the beach.

And there were those in this country who said, "This is not our war," and Hitler listened to them. And then came Pearl Harbor, and most of those said, "Oh yes, yes, it is our war after all, it is our war after all."

The problem is how to organize the peace, how to assure the peace, in the face of appetite and ambition. Since 1945 we have seen this problem posed in many ways. We have not been ourselves directly involved in all of the instances in which this problem has been posed. But nevertheless we and others have joined, at times at considerable sacrifice, to say to the aggressor, "No, gentlemen, this won't do; we're not going to let that chain of events get started; the place to stop it is at the beginning." And so, in one place after another, one country after another, it has been necessary to meet appetite.

But on the other hand it has been necessary to meet appetite with prudence. War was not waged against Greece's northern neighbors during the Greek guerrilla affair. Major units of the Armed Forces were not committed at the time of the Berlin blockade, but rather an airlift was used. Nuclear weapons were not used in Korea, despite the casualties. The Congo was handled painfully and with patience in the United Nations. President Eisenhower built into the placing of troops in the Lebanon a peaceful settlement of that problem. President Kennedy took very special pains to leave open the doors of peaceful solution of the Cuban missile crisis. We waited more than 4 years of infiltration in Southeast Asia before striking the North.

Now, the purpose is to recognize that events must not be allowed to take over, that the possibilities of peaceful settlement must remain open, that we should not elect a large war in place of a small war, that we should not let the infection of violence spread further and faster than it is humanly possible to control, because it is too late in history to solve these issues by war.

These are not easy problems. It is tragic that in the 1960's young men should be faced with what is for them a world war, when they must go and do their duty. It is tragic, in the 1960's, that discussion, private or public, cannot find a solution to these problems at the conference table rather than on the battlefield.

In South Viet-Nam—I know this is much on your minds; I can assure you it's very much on the minds of all of us—the essential elements of the problem are that there are tens of thousands of infiltrators being sent from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam to impose a solution by force upon the people of South Viet-Nam. If you have any doubts about the facts, you can easily run them down. If you wish to deny them, I

can assure you that the other side is no longer denying those facts; so you may be a little out of date.

The second element is that we have a commitment there. We don't have commitments everywhere—not every dispute is ours—but we do have important commitments in different parts of the world, and South Viet-Nam has been one of them. I can go into the details, but I think time does not require it. We know we have a commitment, and the Communist world knows we have a commitment, the rest of the world knows it. And I would say to you that the character of the American commitment is the principal pillar of peace in this present world situation, because there are capitals which could make a monstrous miscalculation if they should come to the conclusion that the American commitment is not worth very much, and we would be confronted with dangers which are extremely difficult even to imagine.

Nevertheless, the path of peaceful settlement has been, and is, wide open. When President Kennedy became President in 1961, he reviewed the situation in Southeast Asia deeply and personally and he decided to try to bring that matter to a peaceful solution. He discussed this with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. They were able to agree in principle as far as Laos was concerned: We all ought to leave those 2 million people in that small landlocked country alone and let them work out their own future. Everyone leave them alone.

That led to the Geneva conference on Laos and an agreement on Laos. The difficulty is that Hanoi did not bring itself into compliance with that agreement for a single day following its signature. Thousands of North Vietnamese troops remained in Laos, and they continued to use Laos as an infiltration route into South Viet-Nam, both specifically contrary to that agreement which they had solemnly signed in 1962.

President Kennedy was not able to get an agreement with Mr. Khrushchev on Viet-Nam in that discussion. But from that time to this, the possibilities of peace in Southeast Asia have been discussed, at every opportunity, on public occasions and private occasions, through public channels and private channels. And the problem simply is that there are those who are determined to bring about a result in South Viet-Nam by force, regardless of what the South Vietnamese people themselves might think about it and in the face of a commitment by the United States and others to South Viet-Nam.

So we have some problems in front of us, but we should, I think, recognize the stimulating prospect that we can take considerable encouragement from the growing recognition that formal and major war is rapidly moving out of the picture and that if we can find an answer to this thing which is miscalled "wars of national liberation" and get it deeply understood on the other side that peaceful coexistence is their best attitude and their best policy, as well as ours, then the human race may be able to look ahead for a considerable period into the future without the threat of a general war on the horizon.

And that is the stake. It's not just South Viet-Nam, although that is important; not just Southeast Asia, although that is critically important. It's the prospect of organizing a peace, and for that purpose no one will find the United States one half step behind but rather one half step in front, searching for that day, because that is at the heart of the simple and decent purposes of the American people, and those purposes are the source of our greatest strength, as well as the source of the greatest promise for the future.

That's why we value the work of your 30 committees. That's why we value the talent

> The BULLETIN has devoted two special issues to International Cooperation Year. The issues of September 6 and November 22 feature articles on 14 of the specific topics assigned to the citizens' committees. A limited number of copies of both issues are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

that is assembled here to help us in this great task. That's why we feel that men at their best can do a great deal to overcome the tragedy of men at their worst.

Now I'm ready for your questions.

**Question-and-Answer Period**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the near future, do you see, sir, an opportunity for a return to a normal relationship with Cuba?*

A. It has been said many times, by the hemisphere as well as by our own Government, that Cuba would be welcomed back into the family of the Western Hemisphere if they would give up their attempt to subvert and terrorize the other nations of this hemisphere and cut their military ties with nations outside the hemisphere. Thus far we have not seen any indication that the present authorities in Havana are prepared to consider either one of those two elementary notions. And in the face of that I think there would be the general view around the hemisphere that there is not yet a place for Cuba in the family of the Western Hemisphere.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the question that I have before me is really not a question, but it's a statement, it's a message for you from someone here—*

A. Please—

*Q. I think it really reflects the mood in which this conference is greeting you, because he says, Mr. Secretary, whatever the question, whatever the answer, you have our deepest sympathy and our cooperation.*

*And then a question: In this country the people are expected to participate in the dialog with Government, in the determination of policy, but what can be done when the CIA seems to be making policy, completely removed from the public and even from Government control?*

A. Well, in the first place, the CIA does not make policy and is not engaged in activities unknown to the policy offices of the Government. There is at the present time, in certain other countries, an organized effort, through forgeries, through lies, to implicate us in situations in which we're not at all implicated. Now this is a difficult problem, but I would emphasize to you that CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government. But you should also bear in mind that beneath the level of public discussion there is a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world. It's a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side. And so once in a while some disagreeable things happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those who have to help us deal with that part of the struggle for freedom, as in other parts of the struggle for freedom.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the following represents a combination of many questions on the same subject, summarized for us by Mr. Norman Cousins after consultation with many groups and individuals.*

*Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, it is possible for Americans who are as strongly opposed to the spread of communism in the world as is the present administration, Americans who are fully informed about the activities of the Viet Cong, Americans who know of the difficulty of getting Hanoi to the conference table, Americans who believe just as deeply as does the administration in the cause of self-determination, whether in Viet-Nam or the Dominican Republic, or anywhere else, Americans who have a fairly sophisticated understanding of the national interest—Mr. Secretary, do you believe that these Americans can feel that they are nonetheless loyal, responsible, and constructive in opposing United States air bombing in Viet-Nam as contrary to America's historical and moral stance, as less rather than more likely to bring about negotiation and can therefore call for an immediate end to the bombing, as being both in the American interest, the human*

*interest, and the interest of world peace?*

A. As you suggested, sir, there are a number of questions in that statement. Let me try to sort out two or three of them.

Of course we know the difference between disloyalty and dissent. Now, the apparatus of the Communist Party, directed from abroad, is busy in this country; we know that. But I hope you will understand that we also know how to draw the distinction between the apparatus and decent, loyal American citizens who are concerned and have differences of view with us. We've never tried to put those two together. Don't ask me to close my eyes to the fact that the apparatus is busy; it is, I know it. But, nevertheless, these are matters on which citizens can have differences of view and differences of judgment.

On the bombing, this is not something that one has to speculate about. One can say, "If you stop the bombing, the other side might do *x*, *y*, or *z*." Now, we're in touch with the other side, regularly—every week—and our contacts with the other side are completely adequate to the problem of finding out whether the stopping of the bombing would be a step toward peace, whether it would lead to discussions on negotiations, whether it would cause the stopping of the bombing of our own people—the South Vietnamese and our own people in the South. We don't have to speculate about that. I can recall the private contacts which resolved the Berlin blockade, the private contacts which brought the Korean war eventually to an end. We've been trying to find out, in view of our public statements that we could stop the bombing as a step toward peace, what the effect would be, what the results would be, what would happen if we did. The other side has had that question in front of it, regularly, and in the process through which they would find it easiest to give an answer—not to your resolutions, not to proclamations, not to public statements—they've been unwilling to give an answer.

Now, it's not just a debater's point—it's not just a debater's point to remind you that we started with a 4-year pause, through stepped-up infiltrations, increasing violence, accompanied by a persistent effort through diplomatic channels to find a peaceful settlement for the problem of Southeast Asia. We didn't say, "Oh, our face is involved; we can't talk to you about this matter if you are bombing our people in South Viet-Nam." We didn't say that. We talked to them about it, tried to find out how we could resolve this question by peaceful means.

It's not just a debater's point to say, when we did pause for several days, that on the third day of that pause we had our answer from each of the Communist capitals involved. And they didn't say to us, "Well, extend the pause for a while so that we can be in touch with you; let us talk this over a bit." They didn't say that. They said it was an insult, or they refused to answer. Or in the case of another capital, they said, "Even if you pause, there will be no negotiation."

Now, I can understand your concern about this problem, and I am not now excluding the possibility of a stopping of the bombing as a step toward peace. But I want you to know that, sitting where I sit, it is not necessary to conjecture about this point. We're in touch with those who can give us the answer, regularly, on this question. So we shall continue our effort to bring this matter from the battlefield to the conference table. Thus far we have not succeeded.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we have had a number of questions dealing with the United Nations and China. This one seems to crystallize many of them. Under what circumstances would the United States remove its opposition to mainland China's representation in the United Nations?*

A. Well, you asked me for a statement about the future; I would prefer to hold off on that for a while. Let me say that our problem with Peiping has not been lack of

contact. We've had 127 talks with Peiping. I think it's fair to say that we've had more talks with Peiping on serious subjects than any government that has diplomatic relations with them, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union. In each of those talks they begin by saying, "There is nothing to discuss, unless you're prepared to surrender Formosa." And when we say that we can't surrender 11 million people to you against their will, then the conversations become rather difficult, and they take the line of the publicly known positions of both sides over the years. When the question of disarmament comes up, when the question of Southeast Asia comes up, when the question of exchanging some newsmen comes up, or exchanges of doctors, this is the reply: "Nothing to discuss until you're prepared to surrender Formosa."

The problem is not one of contact. The problem is that with contact, with contact, it's very difficult to find a basis for improvement of relations. Now, as far as Peiping's present attitude is concerned, a great deal, a great deal, turns upon what judgments they make about whether their present policy is successful or not. We feel that, in the absence of any indications from them or anyone else to the contrary, anything which makes them feel that they're getting along just fine confirms them in a policy and an attitude that clearly points toward war. Now, I was told by someone who could not be charged with being a capitalist, just a few weeks ago, that the number-one question in the world today is trying to turn Peiping to this path of peaceful coexistence. If I had said that, I suppose it would have been greeted as capitalist propaganda. But this is true. There's a lot in that.

Now, Peiping has found itself rejected in Africa, when its foreign minister comes to Africa and says Africa is ripe for revolution, because the governments of Africa know that Peiping is not talking about decolonization, they are talking about the governments of Africa. Peiping has received a setback in Indonesia. They were not able to pursue what seemed to be their threats against India in the India–Pakistan affair. They have some problems. I would hope that those problems would cause them to have some sober second thoughts about the difference between militancy and peaceful coexistence, and if they're prepared to embark upon the path of peaceful coexistence, there will be many around the world, including the people in this country, who would be glad to see them do it and not stand in the way.

*Q. Sir, this question from the Honorable Joseph S. Clark, the distinguished United States Senator from Pennsylvania. Does the State Department support a treaty of general and complete disarmament, as proposed by President Kennedy?*

A. Yes, yes, and we've spent a great deal of time on it, at conferences and in bilateral discussions. We have a lot of reasons for being very serious about disarmament. I mentioned certain ones of them when I talked to you about the problem of war and the necessity for peace in my opening remarks. I suppose you realize that since 1947 the United States has spent $800 billion in defense budgets. Let your 30 committees' imaginations range over what could be accomplished in the world if we could spend $800 billion for some other purpose. What a different world this would be, and for the other side too, because on their economic base they have spent probably at least as much, if not more, relative to the economic base.

Now, we must continue to work at this problem of disarmament, and I hope we can find additional points where we can meet and agree as we did in the nuclear test ban treaty, rather than simply by occupying each other's rear with proposals, a dozen or so on each side, which don't touch the real interests of the other side, or the points of agreement. There is one important problem that stands in the way, apart from certain of the tensions caused by, say, Viet-Nam or other particular issues.

of that sort, and that is the problem of confidence, the problem of how to deal with fear and suspicion in the absence of assurance. On these matters peoples are not likely to trust each other, but what we can do, it seems to me, is to organize machinery which makes the question of trust irrelevant.

Now, I daresay that practically everyone in this room is relaxed about the nuclear test ban treaty, because we can tell you that we do not believe the nuclear test ban treaty is being violated. Suppose we were not able to say that to you. Suppose we had to hold open the prospect of cheating; then the erosion of confidence around the world and the flareup of tension and hate and fear would be extremely difficult to restrain.

Now, let us confess that on this issue we are asking—when we ask for inspection or assurance—we are asking for what might be called a unilateral confession from the Soviet Union, because when they look at us, they're pretty well taken care of. We have an open society; that takes care of about 98 percent of it. You add a few talkative officials to a few energetic reporters, and you add just a little soupçon of espionage, and they've got it made. They know what we're doing and what we're not doing.

But when we look at them it's quite a different matter—it's quite a different matter—a closed society, where we can't give our own people assurances they would be able to give their people if we had an agreement without some sort of inspection or assurance. This turns up in a number of ways on the matter of a comprehensive test ban. We have said recently, and repeatedly: "This is not for us a policy question; this is a technical and scientific question. If the technical and scientific people on both sides would tell us what was possible in terms of assurance, then our policy will adjust to that. Therefore, why don't we let your scientists and technicians, and ours, sit down and see what can be done, and perhaps conduct some joint experiments, to determine what can be done?" The answer is: "No. For us this is not just a scientific and technical question; it's also a policy question. There won't be any inspection."

On the question of defense budgets we have suggested that we should have some what might be called technical discussions on the subject of what goes into a defense budget. In the case of the Soviet Union their research and development budget is outside of what is normally called a defense budget. Our research and development relevant to the military is very heavily inside of our own defense budget. These are things we ought to talk about. They have shown no readiness to sit down and talk over the component elements of the respective defense budgets. But we'll continue to gnaw at it. We've got to; we can't afford to let delays or discouragements turn our hand away from the effort. But it is not a simple thing to bring great powers to a point where they can build a confidence between them, so as we reduce our arms, we can live in confidence with each other.

I'm afraid—I'm afraid I have time, or you have time, for about one more question—you're supposed to be reconvening in another session.

*Q. Yes, thank you. Mr. Secretary, with our best summarizing we still have a number of questions which we are sure you will be glad to have referred for someone to review, but you get a feeling that this is a very serious group of conference-goers who want to know what will happen after this conference, and this question really summarizes what's in many of them. It says: "Many recommendations will come out of this conference. Many of them are not currently a part of our Government's policy. Can you tell us in what ways these recommendations will find a hearing and how we may learn of their consideration by our Government?"*

A. Well, we shall be—I was planning to comment on that later this afternoon when

I receive your reports, but I can assure you that we will be studying the recommendations very carefully and very intensively, and they're not going to be brushed suddenly under the rug or something of that sort. We will be in touch with the committees. I don't think this has been officially said, but I expect to be in touch with the members of the committees to let you know what has happened to your recommendations in due course. Some we can act upon very quickly, others will take a little more time. Would you mind if I were to say also, I will let you know which of your suggestions have already been tried out on the Russians and have been turned down.

## Consulate at Vigo, Spain, Closed; Embassy Madrid To Handle Duties

*Department Statement*

Press release 279 dated December 1

The Department of State announces the closing of the United States consulate at Vigo, Spain, on December 31, 1965. This action results from the continuing worldwide review of the United States overseas program to achieve the most efficient and economical use of available resources while serving fully the needs of the United States Government and its citizens. With the speed of modern communications and modernization and improvement in methods of handling visa and passport applications, it has been determined that the duties heretofore performed by the consulate can be transferred to the Embassy in Madrid.

The Embassy in Madrid will continue to provide service to the United States and Spanish citizens living in the area formerly served by the consulate through periodic visits of its personnel. Questions pertaining to consulate matters or to those of other Government agencies of the United States will be handled by correspondence from Madrid.

The Government of the United States wishes to acknowledge with deep appreciation its long and pleasant association with the officials and people of Vigo and of Galicia.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 89th Congress, 1st Session

Antitrust Exemptions for Agreements Relating to Balance of Payments. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary pursuant to S. Res. 40 and H.R. 5280, an act to provide for exemptions from the antitrust laws in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States. July 15–16, 1965. 248 pp.

Tax Convention With Thailand. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Ex. E. August 11-25, 1965. 181 pp.

Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center (INTERAMA). Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 30, and similar measures to provide for participation of the United States in the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Dade County, Fla., and for other purposes. August 26, 1965. 175 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966. Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee on H.R. 10871, an act making appropriations for foreign assistance and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes. September 8, 1965. 306 pp.

Latin American Development and Western Hemisphere Trade. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee. September 8–10, 1965. 293 pp.

Shipping Restrictions on Grain Sales to Eastern Europe. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. September 17 and 27, 1965. 256 pp.

United States-Canadian Automobile Agreement. Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 9042. September 14–21, 1965. 491 pp.

Technical Amendments to the Act Creating the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. Report to accompany S. 2469. S. Rept. 773. September 23, 1965. 6 pp.

Loan of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H.R. 7812. S. Rept. 781. September 23, 1965. 7 pp.

Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. Report, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 9042. S. Rept. 782. September 27, 1965. 40 pp.

Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1966. Conference report to accompany H.R. 10871. H. Rept. 1103. September 29, 1965. 4 pp.

Tariff Treatment of Articles Assembled Abroad of Products of the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 11216. September 30, 1965. 4 pp.